I derive the exact analytical solution for optimal monetary policy given a Neoclassical Phillips curve and a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. There is a particular range of interest rate rule parameters that may close the output gap. One way of closing the output gap involves stable but high in ‡ation (the divine coincidence). In the general case in ‡ation is variable and potentially lower. Thus, one can achieve stable OR low in ‡ation, but not both. When the productivity shock has an unbounded support, only the variable in ‡ation version of optimal policy is implementable. Optimal policy then involves a lagged interest rate response to shocks and a random walk price level.
Introduction
This paper discusses monetary policy in a model with a Neoclassical Phillips curve and a productivity shock. In one version of the model, the productivity shock has a bounded support (and a uniform distribution). In another version, the shock has an unbounded support (and a lognormal distribution). One result is that the zero lower bound does not prevent the central bank from achieving the …rst best allocation. I describe a simple interest rate rule that implements this allocation. The intuition is that with a Neoclassical Phillips curve, expected in ‡ation is not costly. In equilibrium, the nominal rate may be stable while a variable in ‡ation rate delivers a real interest rate that tracks the natural real rate.
A second result is that the log of the price level follows a random walk (with drift) under optimal monetary policy. A lagged interest rate response to shocks is required, except in a limit case where the in ‡ation rate is high and perfectly stabilized. Since the …rst best allocation is attainable in the present model, there is no commitment problem associated with delivering a lagged interest rate response. Welfare is the same whether in ‡ation is stabilized or not, as long as any movements in in ‡ation are known one period in advance -which is the case under the set of optimal policies considered here.
A third result is that more volatile structural shocks require either a higher in ‡ation rate or a more volatile in ‡ation rate, if output is to be stabilized. The risky steady states for output and in ‡ation 1 depend on the distribution of disturbances and monetary policy. With a bounded productivity shock, there is a range of interest rate rule parameters that deliver output stabilization. One way of closing the output gap in this case involves stable but high in ‡ation (the divine coincidence). That same policy choice -with a high enough in ‡ation target -would deliver output stabilization also given a New Keynesian Phillips Curve, when productivity shocks have a bounded support. The straightforward reason for this is that a high enough in ‡ation target gives room enough for maneuver, so that real shocks always can be absorbed by a variable nominal interest rate. But with a Neoclassical Phillips Curve there are more options for output stabilization, and in ‡ation may be variable and potentially lower under optimal policy. The latter point is a result highlighted in this paper.
The menu of possible policies that will deliver an optimal outcome narrows to only one possible choice in the context of an unbounded productivity shock; Output is fully stabilized if and only if in ‡ation varies around its trend, and tracks the natural real interest rate. This policy choice would not deliver output stabilization under a New Keynesian Phillips Curve, where fully expected but variable in ‡ation is costly.
If authorities deviate from optimal policy, and instead choose to stabilize in ‡ation closer to its trend, there will be episodes of negative output gaps. The distribution of in ‡ation and output gaps will then be skewed to the left. This policy is not time consistent. The frequency of hitting the zero lower bound will be increasing in the variance of productivity shocks, decreasing in the level of the in ‡ation target, and increasing in the degree to which in ‡ation is stabilized. This paper is not about price level determinacy or the potential multiplicity of equilibria associated with the zero lower bound on interest rates 2 . Rather, it is concerned with situations where monetary policy may be prevented from being expansionary enough to stabilize output, as discussed in seminal work by Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) .
Much of the literature on the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate relates to the case of a New Keynesian Phillips curve 3 . As discussed in among others Wolman (1998) , Adam and Billi (2007) and Nakov (2008) , the degree of intrinsic (endogenous) in ‡ation stickiness determines the costs of the zero lower bound constraint. The value of being able to implement policy under commitment is higher when in ‡ation is more sticky.
In this paper, some agents set prices ‡exibly, while some agents set prices one period in advance. Synchronized price setting creates a Neoclassical Phillips curve and enables me to derive an exact analytical solution, following Henderson and Kim (2001) . The case of a Neoclassical Phillips curve may be of interest because it represents a limit case; Systematic monetary policy is useful 4 , but anticipated policy beyond the next period does not have real e¤ects even though agents are fully forward looking. The Neoclassical Phillips curve establishes an example where price level targeting is unhelpful in a low in ‡ation environment. It may on the other hand be argued that the New Keynesian Phillips curve describes a case where anticipated policy too far into the future is powerful, and where the value of commitment might be overestimated.
As shown in Alstadheim (2013) , the Neoclassical Phillips curve may be derived as the limit of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, when …rms fully index their prices to expected future in ‡ation. However, a model with the generalized Phillips curve cannot be solved without approximation. In this paper, I study an exact solution in order to integrate the treatment of level e¤ects and stabilization e¤ects of policy. I therefore focus on the limit case of a Neoclassical version only.
I abstract from distortions other than the one-sector price stickiness. This means that if policy removes the price stickiness distortion, any potential commitment problem also disappears in this paper. The results in Adam and Billi (2007) and Ngo (2014) highlight that level e¤ects of policy under discretionary policy may have particular importance, given a potentially binding zero lower bound constraint, when optimal policy is not time-consistent. Those issues are not covered here.
The simple rule considered in this paper is optimal in the sense described in Woodford (2001) . I use a public …nance approach, where I solve for the optimal allocation in the economy, and then back out the set of parameters of the simple rule that deliver the …rst best outcome. The optimal rule responds directly to productivity shocks, and not only to endogenous variables.
The next section describes the model. In section 3, I solve the ‡exible-price version of the model. In section 4, I derive the sticky-price solution and present optimal monetary policy in the case of a uniform distribution of the productivity shock. I calibrate constant terms describing the risky steady states such that nominal levels increase when the volatility of shocks, and policy parameters, imply more interest rate volatility. In this way, the nominal interest rate never violates the zero lower bound constraint. It is thereby shown that a more stable in ‡ation rate necessarily goes with a higher steady state in ‡ation rate under optimal policy. I present a menu of di¤erent optimal monetary policies. In section 5, I derive the solution for the model given a lognormal distribution of the shock, and I present optimal policy in that case. There, I also simulate the model, in order to illustrate the link between the degree of in ‡ation stabilization and the frequency with which the zero lower bound is encountered. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
The model
The model includes a continuum of agents who are yeoman farmers. The agents belong either to a ‡exible price goods production sector or a one-period-inadvance price setting sector, and there is monopolistic competition. Goods from the two sectors are combined into one composite consumption good. Agents learn which sector they will belong to in the next period at the point in time when the sticky price agents need to set their price. They buy state contingent claims before they learn which sector they will belong to, which ensures perfect risk sharing. Equation (1) below describes that the representative agent maximizes utility with respect to the composite consumption good c; her output price p and money m and bonds b, subject to a period budget constraint, where t is the Langrange multiplier. is the agent's discount factor on period utility. describes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. The period utility term 1 2 t y 2 t represents disutility from producing output y t in period t: is an i.i.d. supply shock that will be common to the two production sectors 5 . It will determine the natural real interest rate.
The last term in the period utility function, f ( mt Pt ), represents utility from holding real money balances. I let in equation (4) be a number close to zero and disregard any welfare e¤ects from money holdings in the following. However, modelling money demand is necessary for completeness and in order to capture the zero lower bound on interest rates. P t is the price of c t in terms of m t . represents a satiation level of real money balances 6 .
Each agent maximizes utility subject to the constraint that income from production after taxes or subsidies, (1+!)p t y t ; plus …nancial assets and their return brought over from last period (money m t 1 , bonds b t 1 and (1 + i t 1 )b g t 1 ) must equal taxes t t , consumption expenditure P t c t and new holdings of …nancial assets. b g t is the nominal value of risk free government bonds, while b t is a vector of quantities of state contingent claims, and t;t+1 is the vector of the prices of those claims. Each state contingent claim pays one unit of currency in the subsequent period given a particular realization of the state in that period. The gross risk free nominal interest rate, 1 + i t (I will also use I t for this variable) is therefore equal to [ t;t+1 1] 1 ; where 1 is a vector of ones. The maximization problem is
where
5 In a yeoman farmer model, the labor market is internalized. may be interpreted as a labor supply shock or a productivity shock. In particular, following Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) , the productivity variable may be understood as follows: Let disutility from work e¤ort l be given by -l and the production function be Al ; < 1: Inverting the production function gives l = ( y 2 : 6 Without a satiation level, the nominal interest rate can reach the zero lower bound only in the limit when real balances go to in…nity. and
c s;t in (2) is de…ned in (3) as the composite sticky-price good, where j indexes producers of di¤erent period t 'sticky-price' (s) goods c js ; t . i indexes the ' ‡exible-price'(f ) goods (c if;t ) that go into the c f;t composite ‡exible-price good. indicates the strength of preference for the good produced in the sticky price sector.
Equilibrium conditions are derived in the online appendix A, where the e¤ect of monopolistic competition on output is eliminated by the subsidy 1 + ! = 1 : Symmetry across producers and risk sharing among consumers simpli…es aggregation. Since every period in the model may be described by the following equations (and in this sense the model is not dynamic), I replace time subscript t by +1 and 1 time subscripts. Capital letters denote aggregate quantities, and in ‡ation
and
(sticky-price output) (8) Equations (5)- (8) may be used together with some speci…cation for monetary and …scal policy to solve for in ‡ation ; aggregate sticky price sector output Y s ; aggregate ‡exible price sector output Y f ; aggregate total output Y and 1 + i. I will use both I and 1 + i to denote the gross nominal interest rate in the following.
Monetary and …scal policy
Similar to Kim and Henderson (2005) , I assume that authorities use an interest rate rule in the class:
(interest-rate rule)
Woodford (2001) studies conditions under which a rule like the Taylor rule (see Taylor (1993) , Taylor (1999) ) delivers optimal outcomes in a simple New Keynesian model. (9) is in the spirit of the results in Woodford (2001) , except that it is in levels rather than in logs. The size of the response coe¢ cient may potentially be constrained by the zero lower bound and thus be state dependent in this paper.
Woodford notes that a standard Taylor rule will deliver the optimal allocation of output in a simple New Keynesian model under certain conditions: First, the rule needs to respond directly to the natural real interest rate in order to deliver the optimal outcome. As Woodford, p. 235, points out: "such a variable intercept is actually in the spirit of Taylor's prescription, which describes the intercept as incorporating "the central bank's estimate of the equilibrium real rate of interest" (Taylor, 1999, p.325 )". In this paper, the term A second condition noted in Woodford (2001), is that the rule needs to prescribe a response to an appropriately de…ned output gap. In this paper, the divine coincidence applies, and a direct response to output is therefore not needed in order to close the output gap. Also, with a Neoclassical rather than a New Keynesian Phillips curve, in ‡ation stabilization will only be one among several alternative ways of stabilizing output. A direct response to the output gap will not be needed under those alternative optimal policies either.
Woodford also notes that the interest rate rule should adhere to the Taylor principle by responding su¢ ciently strongly to the in ‡ation rate. I will …x the calibration of at = 1:5 throughout this paper. My approach is to derive the optimal ( ‡exible price) output level and then back out the required policy parameters k and 1 that support this allocation, while may be left at for example 1:5. Among optimal policy parameters, I will then select those that produce equilibria that are consistent with the zero lower bound on the interest rate. This approach means that I will not consider implications of possible o¤ equilibrium path expectations.
The policy parameter I governs the gross level of nominal variables. Since I do not impose certainty equivalence, the steady state levels will depend on policy and the variance of shocks. But in order to aid intuition, we may for a moment consider the nonstochastic case; A given gross in ‡ation target would be supported by the policy parameter choice I = 1 ; where the exponent 1 is needed in order to account for the exponent on the level of in ‡ation in the rule. The associated steady state gross nominal interest rate would then be I SS = 1 :
I will apply two alternative ways of anchoring the policy choice of I and hence . In sections 3 and 4, I will calibrate I to make the levels of nominal rates and in ‡ation rates as low as possible, while still staying clear o¤ the zero lower bound in equilibrium under di¤erent levels of variance for the structural shock . The risky steady state nominal interest rates and in ‡ation rate will therefore be higher when the variance of shocks is higher and when policy requires the nominal rate to be more variable. In section 5, I will calibrate I to make the risky steady state nominal interest rate I ss stable as the variance of disturbances changes. In both cases, I will depend on the variance of in order to produce the desired nominal paths.
Utility maximization and the No-Ponzi-game condition (see online appendix A) together establish the transversality condition;
I assume throughout that …scal policy makes sure that the transversality condition holds, so that …scal policy is passive, as in Leeper (1991) . When initial net public debt m n + b n is positive it will be satis…ed with e.g. a balanced budget rule for …scal policy, if the nominal interest rate is at least marginally positive with some positive probability.
The ‡exible-price model
Flexible prices in both sectors mean that the relative price is determined by the …xed parameter ;
and output in the two sectors are given by
Substituting the above into the expression for aggregate output
implies that
In the symmetric case, where = 1 2 ; we have
With output given by equation (13), the unknown variables are the in ‡ation rate and the nominal interest rate. The demand equation and the interest-rate rule now give me a system of two equations in two unknown, and I,
3.1 The ‡exible-price model solution.
In order to solve (15) and (16), I follow Henderson and Kim (2001) and use the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. The guess for the solution for price in ‡ation is
An assumption about the distribution of has to be made, and here I assume that has a uniform distribution between L and H , L < H ; and I will assume E( ) = 1. In the online appendix B, it is shown that (17) is a solution of (15) and (16) with parameters as given in table 1 7 . (1.1)
The risky steady state level of the in ‡ation rate, equal to = (1) (1) 1 = , is determined by the I level in the interest rate rule, as well as by the volatility of shocks and monetary policy. The expression for in table 1 re ‡ects an I that is normalized to be as low as possible, given the zero lower bound on interest rates (see the online appendix) and the volatility of disturbances. In particular, it turns out that
minimizes the feasible steady state nominal interest rate and in ‡ation rate. With this I , the solution for is given in (1.3), and the equilibrium nominal interest rate is given by:
7 Note that with uniform between L and H ; we have
1:
The equilibrium nominal interest rate reaches its minimum when = L , and its maximum when = H , and the risky steady state is I SS = (
: This is true as long as + 0; which will be the case in this paper. Intuitively, the nominal interest rate might need to be relatively high when the shock takes on a high value, because then productivity is expected to increase ( is expected to fall), consumption and potential output are expected to increase, and this situation is characterized by a relatively high natural real interest rate.
Strict in ‡ation targeting in the ‡exible-price model
From the general solution for in ‡ation in equation (17) together with table 1, we know that in order to stabilize the in ‡ation rate perfectly we need = 1 = 0. If authorities respond to shocks directly, they can let
in which case in ‡ation is constant and given by
The risky steady state in ‡ation rate, ; is increasing in the variance of (mean preserving spreads around = 1). The equilibrium nominal interest rate is now variable and given by
If authorities choose to let ! 1, they can stabilize the in ‡ation rate completely regardless of and 1 since = 1 = 0 also in that case. The constant in ‡ation rate and the equilibrium nominal interest rate are still given by (21) and (22).
A low but variable in ‡ation level in the ‡exible-price model
For future reference, it is useful to derive the ‡exible price solution with di¤erent types of monetary policy. The lowest possible in ‡ation level is attainable with a nominal rate as low as possible in steady state. From equation (19), I know that a constant nominal interest rate at zero requires:
Given equation (1.1) and (1.2) in table 1, this requires
while and can be chosen according to (23) . With this policy, and given (18) , the equilibrium in ‡ation rate is
while the equilibrium solution for the nominal interest rate is
With this policy, authorities stabilize the nominal interest rate by letting the expected in ‡ation rate instead of the nominal interest rate move along with the natural real rate in equilibrium. In order to achieve this, we have seen in equation (24) that the policymaker has to respond to the lagged productivity shock. The interest rate rule also responds to in ‡ation, and the net e¤ect is a stable nominal interest rate in equilibrium.
The in ‡ation rate may also vary with the contemporaneous shock if there is an interest rate response ; but the net e¤ect is again that the equilibrium nominal interest rate is stable at zero regardless of this 8 .
4
The sticky-price model with a uniform distribution of the productivity shock I use the same approach as in the ‡exible-price case, but with price stickiness in the model I need to solve for in ‡ation and output simultaneously. I …rst simplify the model in order to get a pair of equations in and Y only. Next, I use the interest-rate rule and guesses for output and in ‡ation solutions to solve using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients.
8 I is in the case of > 0 given by:
Inserting the above expression and the solution for 1 + i in (16) and using 1 = 1+ we get
Simplifying the price equation
In order to write the price equation in terms of aggregate output and in ‡ation only, I derive the sticky-price sector output and the ‡exible-price sector output as functions of total output. Use (5) to substitute out
Rearrange (7) to get an expression for Y f in terms of Y;
Substituting out for Y f in (27) and simplifying gives Y s as a function of Y only,
Substituting for (28) and (29) in equation (5) gives the Neoclassical Phillips curve:
(1
(30) This equation says that the in ‡ation rate is determined by the expected in ‡ation rate as of the last period, actual output and expected output.
Solving the sticky-price model with a uniform distribution of the productivity shock
I now have the price equation and the demand equation, and I add an interestrate rule:
Equations ( where the distribution of again is uniform between L and H , and the the coe¢ cients are as given in table 2. Now, is the risky steady state of output, while still is the risky steady state of in ‡ation. 
Equation (2.1) shows that output now depends on both current monetary policy, and monetary policy one period ahead, through and 1 : In order to get some intuition for the constant terms and , see footnote 7.
Again, embeds a normalization of I to produce the lowest feasible nominal interest rate and in ‡ation rate, given the zero lower bound and structural shocks.
Under certain conditions, the "sticky price part" of the risky steady state of output -which are the extra terms in addition to K (compare equation (2.5) to equation (13)) -drops out, and the risky steady state of output is equal to its ‡exible price level. In particular, this happens under optimal stabilization policy, in the particular case of log utility ( = 1): See the online appendix E.
The divine coincidence: output stabilization with a stable in ‡ation rate
Authorities can achieve perfect stabilization of output if they stabilize the in‡ation rate; = 1 = 0 is achieved by = 1+ and 1 = 0 (or by ! 1). Technically, then reduces to 1 1+ ; so that the time-varying part of output follows the exact path of the time-varying part of ‡exible-price output, see equation (13). With = 1, the constant term then is also equal to its ‡exible-price counterpart ( = K):
The reason why a constant in ‡ation rate eliminates output gap distortions, is that with a fully expected constant in ‡ation rate, sticky price sector price setters know which price to set one period in advance. There is then no distortion of relative prices. This makes sure that the allocation of production and consumption across sectors is e¢ cient. The constant in ‡ation rate, equal to the risky steady state in ‡ation rate, is now given by
The solution for the nominal rate is (like in the ‡exible price case with in ‡ation targeting) given by:
The risky steady state for the nominal interest rate, with E( ) = 1; is given by
which also is increasing in mean preserving spreads of around = 1:
Output stabilization with a low but variable in ‡ation rate
There is another way of stabilizing output, besides strict in ‡ation targeting: If authorities respond to the current shock in the next period, and agents observe the current shock before they set next period's prices, the variation in the in ‡a-tion rate comes as no surprise and is then not costly in terms of output in this model. Monetary authorities can then track the natural real interest rate to the extent that they can determine the in ‡ation rate in the next period -which they do in this model.
Technically, for the purpose of output stabilization, we are still looking for a rule that yields
(35) is satis…ed if
9 Any constant in ‡ation rate higher than is attainable by adjusting I correspondingly. (35) holds, the nominal interest rate is also stable and equal to zero when = 0 and (35) holds and is bounded. This policy then establishes the minimum possible nominal equilibrium that is attainable in this model.
Note that authorities cannot postpone the e¤ect of the shock on the in ‡a-tion rate further by responding to shocks lagged more than one period, and still stabilize output. The reason is that authorities rely on the current variation in the in ‡ation rate to create a real interest rate equal to the natural rate.
10 Using = = 0, the interest rate rule that establishes the minimal in ‡ation rate and a stable nominal interest rate is given by
In equilibrium, the solution for the interest rate will be given by
The risky steady state in ‡ation rate is given by
and the equilibrium in ‡ation rate is
1 0 It might seem that authorities could infer the lagged supply shock from the solution for the in ‡ation rate, since the solution is = 1+ 1 : One might therefore think that responding to a function of the in ‡ation rate instead of the lagged shock directly could yield the …rst-best solution. However, the in ‡ation rate that closes the output gap depends on the lagged shock only because monetary authorities respond to the lagged shock, as can be seen from the expression for 1 in table 2. If we eliminate 1 from the interest-rate rule and let the authorities respond to the appropriate function of the in ‡ation rate instead, all response parameters in the reaction function cancel out. Authorities are left with a rule that says they should peg the nominal rate at zero.
Output stabilization in the general case: The price level is a random walk
We may make (36) hold with any set of parameters chosen from a particular set; = 1 + and 1 = (1 ) 1 + , where 2 (0; 1):
With parameters chosen from this set, = 0; and 1 = (1 ) 1+ ,
: Hence, with a lower , more emphasis is put on interest rate stability, and less on in ‡ation stability. The output gap is stabilized with any , but the minimum feasible risky steady state in ‡ation level (given by ) is lower with a lower : Unless = 1 (a perfectly stabilized in ‡a-tion rate), the in ‡ation rate inherits the stochastic process of : The log of the price level is a random walk with drift under optimal monetary policy: 
Policy parameters in above case
Policy parameters in above case ! 1;or ! 1 Figure 1 illustrates how stabilization policy works in this model. A productivity shock ( decreases by 0.5%) that increases potential output in period 1 by 0.25 percentage points is illustrated in the …rst panel. A one percentage point (annualized) lower real interest rate for one period is needed in order to keep the output gap closed. A higher would require an even stronger interest rate response (intertemporal substitution would then be less elastic). An optimally designed "quite strict in ‡ation targeting policy" ( = 0:8) requires the nominal interest rate to fall in the same period. But since the fall in the nominal interest rate is not made quite strong enough to establish the required fall in the real interest rate when < 1, authorities will need to respond somewhat to the shock with an expansionary policy in the next period as well ( k 1 > 0). In ‡ation increases somewhat in period 2 (by 0.2 percentage points annualized). The net e¤ect on the nominal interest rate in period 2 is zero.
A much more moderate contemporaneous interest rate response ( = 0:2) is also consistent with output stabilization. The in ‡ation rate increases by 0.8 percentage points in period 2 under this policy, while the nominal rate goes down by 20 basis points in period 1. Again, the real interest rate falls by one percentage point for one period. The high in ‡ation rate in the next period, combined with the lagged response to the productivity shock in that period, mean that the net equilibrium change in the nominal interest rate in the next period again will be zero. The output gap -the deviation of output from its ‡exible price solution given in equation 13 -will be zero under any 11 :
Implications for the levels of risky steady states and the volatility of interest rates and in ‡ation rates under di¤erent policies are presented in table 4 for a benchmark case (where = 0:995; = 0:5; = 1; E( ) = 1, and L ; H are chosen to give a standard deviation of ‡exible price output equal to 0.5%, which is the case when the standard deviation of is 1%). A strict in ‡ation targeting policy implies increasing steady states for interest rates and in ‡ation, as the volatility of the productivity shock increases. Recall that the intercept term of the interest rate rule adjusts in order to keep all possible interest rate outcomes at or above zero, for any given L parameter. = 1:0 3.50 (2.00) 1.50 (0.00) * ) T h e r i s k y s t e a d y s t a t e i s c a l c u l a t e d f r o m t h e a n a l y t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s , a n n u a l i z e d n e t v a l u e i n p e r c e n t . T h e s t a n d E¤ects of exogenous volatilities on risky steady states and standard deviations of endogenous variables under di¤erent policies are illustrated in …gure 2. The "stable interest rate policy" implies an increasing standard deviation of the in ‡ation rate, as the volatility of the productivity shock increases (see the lower left panel of …gure 2). The risky steady state interest rate is una¤ected by the volatility of the productivity shock in this case, see upper right panel of …gure 2.
Along with the lower risky steady state nominal rate, we also observe a lower risky steady state in ‡ation rate. With a lower ; and thus a less stable in ‡ation rate, a lower risky steady state in ‡ation rate is attainable for any given volatility of exogenous shocks.
The sticky-price model with a lognormal distribution
In this section, a case where the support of is unbounded is considered. In particular, LN (0; 2 ). Now, the steady state levels of the interest rate and in ‡ation rate can, under strict in ‡ation targeting, never be high enough to always close the output gap: there will always be cases where the natural real rate is lower than the negative of the in ‡ation target. The menu of optimal policies consistent with the zero lower bound in table 3 is therefore narrowed to = 0 only. I now calibrate the policy parameter I such that the risky steady state interest rate stays constant as the parameter describing exogenous volatility increases (see online appendix D).
Section 5.1 below derives the solution of the model with a lognormal distribution of . In section 5.2, I consider nonlinear policies, where authorities emphasize in ‡ation stabilization ( > 0) during low-volatility, or normal times. The response to contemporaneous shocks is lowered to make the interest rate stay at zero each time the shock takes on a particularly large negative value and the zero lower bound is encountered. With the response-coe¢ cients now being constrained in certain periods, a negative output gap will be unavoidable during such zero lower bound episodes.
Solving the model with a lognormal distribution
Using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, the solutions for output and in ‡ation are given by
where the solution is given in table 5. The dynamics of endogenous variables, described by equations (5.1)-(5.3), is the same as before. The parameters describing the distribution of again appear in the risky steady states of output, and in ‡ation : The solution is derived in the online appendix D. With the benchmark calibration in table 6, …gure 3 illustrates how risky steady states and standard deviations of endogenous variables depend on the standard deviation of the productivity shock under di¤erent optimal policies ( = 0; = 0:5 and = 1). I let the parameter scale the in ‡ation level that I produces. Under all optimal policies, the risky steady state quarterly gross nominal rate will be I SS = 1 , while = expf 1 2 ( 1+ ) 2 2 g: Figure 3 shows annualized net levels in percent.
Only the = 0 (stable optimal interest rate) policy is consistent with a possible equilibrium, since the productivity shock may take on negative values of unlimited size. The two other alternatives illustrated in …gure 3 abstract from the zero lower bound. In the case of a lognormal distribution, optimal stabilization policy will produce = K, so that also the level of output will be equal to the ‡exible price level under all structural parameters (see online appendix E).
Nonlinear policies and the frequency of zero lower bound episodes
In this subsection I assume that authorities choose > 0: When authorities observe a large negative -shock, the natural real interest rate will be particu- larly low, and it might be impossible to respond fully to that shock during the present period, since (in logs) we have
One might think that it would be possible to increase the in ‡ation target in the interest rate rule during such zero lower bound episodes, in order to create enough in ‡ation to stay o¤ the zero lower bound, and keep the response coef…cients optimal at any given . However, technically the solution derived does not apply if i is stochastic. And we know that in ‡ation surprises create output gaps in this model.
One might also think that one could stay o¤ the zero lower bound by switching to an = 0 policy during zero lower bound episodes only. However, the choice of impinges not only on the contemporaneous response coe¢ cient ; but also on the response coe¢ cient 1 and hence the assumed response to the contemporaneous shock in the next period. For the change to = 0 today not to create an output distortion in the next period, authorities would have to stick to = 0 in the next period as well, and in each period after that. An > 0 policy will therefore be dominated by an = 0 policy; Sooner or later the zero lower bound will be binding, at which point authorities would like to lower . Since …rst best optimal policy is implementable at all times with = 0, any other policy will require commitment and be time inconsistent.
In order to shed light on how authorities anyway could implement in ‡ation stabilization (assuming a commitment technology is available) during periods where the zero lower bound is not binding, I simulate the model. Authorities choose a small enough k ; to exactly stay at the zero lower bound, in periods where the constraint otherwise would be violated. This will produce a negative output gap during zero lower bound episodes, because < 1+ while 1 = (1 ) 1+ . In ‡ation will be relatively low during such zero lower bound episodes, because a too contractionary monetary policy pulls in ‡ation down.
The simulations are conducted by searching for the maximum possible contemporaneous response coe¢ cient k each time the zero lower bound is encountered. A k close to the optimal 1+ is feasible when is not too negative and is low. An outcome for the equilibrium interest rate in a small range around zero is permitted in the simulations (the zero lower bound is in the range of +/-20 basis points here), and hence the interest rate does not stop at exactly zero during each zero lower bound episode.
Figures 4-6 show simulations of the model with the calibration given in table 6. In …gure 4, = 1 during "normal" times, but in ‡ation falls below target if a zero lower bound event kicks in. Two such events occur in the simulation shown. The distribution of in ‡ation is therefore skewed to the left. With lower ambitions regarding in ‡ation stabilization around trend ( = 0:5) in …gure 5, no zero lower bound episode is triggered in the 100 period (25 year) simulation shown. This result is sensitive to the calibration of the model. With a higher exogenous volatility or a lower in ‡ation target, more zero lower bound episodes will be triggered. In …gure 6, where = 0, in ‡ation is more volatile and the interest rate is constant at its risky steady state level.
Concluding remarks
Policy prescriptions regarding the zero lower bound constraint appear to be sensitive to the nature of the Phillips Curve. They have been shown to be sensitive to other distortions than those originating from price stickiness as well, but in this paper the focus is on the e¤ects of price stickiness only.
In this model, welfare is maximized when the output gap is closed; I consider the cashless limit, and there are no other allocations than money and output to be concerned about. With the Neoclassical Phillips Curve, the "divine coincidence" result from the New Keynesian Phillips Curve is modi…ed.
First, if we disregard the zero lower bound or consider a bounded support for the exogenous shock, a wide set of nominal paths is consistent with output gap stabilization and welfare maximization. When one introduces the zero lower bound, it has been shown elsewhere that in ‡ation stabilization is no longer time consistent in the simplest New Keynesian Phillips Curve case. However, in the Neoclassical Phillips Curve case studied here, there is still one type of policy that is time consistent and optimal. Under that policy, the price level follows a random walk with drift, while the interest rate rule prescribes a response to shocks with a lag.
